Samples, Pluralism, and a few tsetse flies in my room

Yeah, that's right. Tsetse flies. sleeping sickness. Seems like the only possible explanation for my current state of fatigue.

First up, Lauer and Asher seem to have redeemed themselves to me. I did not expect the understandable explanations given of N, n, K, and the variance in confidence limits. I only had a couple issues: first, when presenting tables of data, the aforementioned terms are explained and examined, but then others, like t and p from table 4-6 are left swinging free, without even giving us a hint. Don't get me wrong, I like a good scholarly tease as much as the next student, but a tease is ineffective if it doesn't at least wink at its audience. t and p just stare brazenly at me, while the means they are neighbors with have already shown me around their non-representative house. 2ndly, I really wish the explanation of Stratified samples had come sooner in the chapter, because I had to deal with a flirtatious "(see below)" multiple times before getting at the term directly, even though it was used in the descriptions of sample generation in a way that let me know it was an important concept.

Next up, Methodological Pluralism by Kirsch. May I just say, good stuff here. It would seem that no matter where you go in Composition Studies, you end up North. He's inescapable, but I start to see why--on page 254 he "questions methodological pluralisn without endorsing any single methodology." Additionally, the emphasis on epistemology was a breath of fresh air and vindication for those of us who delve into philosphy amidst that most vexing of questions, "But what does this have to do with real life?" Obviously, making clear what you accept as truth, knowledge, reality or evidence is the first step in recognizing what makes for validity in research and its reporting.
The Pemberton quote on p.250 point to the strain that we've been slam-dancing with in each class discussion--scope (global description) vs accuracy (close description). Both of these have value, but which is accorded weight is entirely dependent on Harding's principle of relation, purpose, and agenda (256). I love how boldy the inescapability of intentionality is stated; "agenda" has acquired a negative connotative flavor, but it is simply an inescapable condition of knowledge creation. S/he who claims to have no agenda either lies or has not examined their motivations. With no motivations or agenda, there would be no reason to research.